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INTRODUCTION

THE

CONCEPT OF SPEEDY TRIAL has been an integral part of
the Anglo-American system of criminal justice for seven
centuries.1 During all but the past decade, however, little or no
attention has been paid to fixing the concept's boundaries. "Speedy
trial" has been one of those convenient, weasel-word concepts
capable of being expanded and contracted like an accordian.
Under the influence of a computer-oriented society, an attempt to
quantify this hoary right has been made.
Shucking the usual, passive case by case judicial posture, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1973 reached out aggressively with
its rule making power and, through its promulgation of rule 1100 of
the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2 dictated the number
of days within which a case is to be tried and under what
circumstances that number of days may be enlarged.

t Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County. Lecturer, Temple
University. B.S., University of Pennsylvania, 1955; L.L.B., Boston University School
of Law, 1958. Special thanks to Samuel R. Olken, a student at Penn Charter and
summer intern with Judge Marshall, for his enthusiastic and scholarly research and
assistance.
t B.A., Temple University, 1950; L.L.B., Temple University, 1953. Member,
District of Columbia and Pennsylvania Bars.
1. See notes 3 & 4 and accompanying text infra.
2. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1100 provides:
(a)(1) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the
defendant after June 30, 1973 but before July 1, 1974 shall commence no later
than two hundred seventy (270) days from the date on which the complaint is
filed.
(2) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the
defendant after June 30, 1974 shall commence no later than one hundred eighty
(180) days from the date on which the complaint is filed.
(b) For the purpose of this Rule, trial shall be deemed to commence on the
date the trial judge calls the case to trial.
(c) At any time prior to the expiration of the period for commencement of
trial, the attorney for ,the Commonwealth may apply to the court for an order
extending the time for commencement of trial. A copy of such application shall
be served upon the defendant through his attorney, if any, and the defendant
shall also have the right to be heard thereon. Such application shall be granted
only if trial cannot be commenced within the prescribed period despite due
diligence by the Commonwealth. Any order granting such application shall
specify the date or period within which trial shall be commenced.
(d) In determining the period for commencement of trial, there shall be
excluded therefrom such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as
results from:
(1) the unavailability of the defendant or his attorney;

(284)
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This article is an examination of the mischief that led to the
need for the rule's promulgation, the meaning of the rule, and where
the rule has led the criminal justice system in Pennsylvania during
the four years of the rule's existence.
II.

GENESIS OF RULE 1100, PROMPT TRIAL

The genesis of the right to a speedy trial can be found in the
earliest English law. In 1214, the Magna Carta provided for the right
to a speedy trial. Specifically, it said, "We will sell to no man, we will
not deny or defer to any man either justice or right."3 Twice a year
the jails were emptied and the prisoners confined were either tried
and convicted or freed from custody.4 This did not necessarily mean
that defendant was acquitted of the charges, but he had to be
released from custody.
Five centuries after the Magna Carta, the colonists of the United
States, instituting an independent form of government, included a
5
speedy trial provision in the sixth amendment to the Constitution.
From that point until the last decade, various assaults were made on
the problem of providing a speedy trial to an accused. Several states
passed statutes to implement the constitutional mandate; some
provided that an accused must be discharged from custody if he
failed to make bail and was not brought to trial within a certain
period after arrest or indictment. 6 It was required generally that the
(2) any continuance in excess of thirty (30) days granted at the request of
the defendant or his attorney, provided that only the period beyond the thirtieth
(30th) day shall be so excluded.
(e)(1) When a trial court has granted a new trial and no appeal has been
perfected, a new trial shall commence within one hundred and twenty (120) days
after the date of the order granting a new trial.
(2) When an appellate court has granted a new trial, or has affirmed an
order of a trial court granting a new trial, the new trial shall commence within
one hundred and twenty (120) days after the appellate court remands the record
to the trial court. The date of remand shall be the date as it appears in the
appellate court docket.
(f) At any time before trial, the defendant or his attorney may apply to the
court for an order dismissing the charges with prejudice on the ground that this
Rule has been violated. A copy of such application shall be served upon the
attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall also have the right to be heard
thereon. Any order granting such application shall dismiss the charges with
prejudice and discharge the defendant.
(g) Nothing in this Rule shall be construed to modify any time limit
contained in any statute of limitation.
PA. R.

CRIM. P.

1100.

3. 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTE OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 45 (1642).
4. See 14 AM. JuR. Criminal Law § 134 (1938) (citations omitted).
5. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial." U. S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. See, e.g., In re Begerow, 133 Cal. 349, 65 P. 828 (1901), citing CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1382 (West 1972); Walker v. State, 89 Ga. 482, 15 S.E. 553 (1892), citing GA.
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accused make a demand for speedy trial in order to avail himself of
the provisions of the right.7 In only a few jurisdictions did the
statutes provide a complete discharge from all prosecution upon a
violation of speedy trial rights. 8
Since the mid-1960's, there has been a gradual, but significant,
change occurring with respect to quantifying the constitutional right
to a speedy trial. In 1966, the United States Supreme Court, in
United States v. Ewell,9 recognized that speedy trial rights might
interfere with other due process rights of the accused and might
seriously impinge on society's efforts to protect itself. The Court
seemed aware of the problem but was reluctant to take any drastic
action to resolve the situation. The Supreme Court in Klopfer v.
North Carolina,' again recognizing the problem, announced that
the speedy trial right is "one of the most basic rights preserved by
our Constitution."1 The Court further amplified the problem in
Dickey v. Florida'2 wherein Justice Brennan expressed concern that
such a fundamental right as speedy trial had so little definition and
13
that its scope raised so many questions.
The problem continued to be ventilated by the Supreme Court in
its decisions United States v. Marion,'4 Barker v. Wingo,15 and
Strunk v. United States.'6 Through these cases, the Court began
4648 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1901 (1972)); Respublica
v. Arnold, 3 Yeates 263 (Pa. 1801). Accord, Loy v. Grayson, 99 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1957),
citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 915.01(2) (West 1944) (repealed 1971).
PENAL CODE §

7. See, e.g., Loy v. Grayson, 99 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1957), citing FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 915.01(2) (West 1944) (repealed 1971); Commonwealth v. Hanley, 337 Mass. 384, 149
N.E.2d 608 (1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958), citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
277, § 72 (West 1972). Contra,Hicks v. People, 148 Colo. 21, 364 P,2d 877 (1961), citing
CoLo. REv. STAT. §39-7-12 (1953) (current version at COLO.REV. STAT. § 18-1-405
(1973)); Commonwealth ex rel. Sukaly v. Maroney, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 117, 191 A.2d 893
(1963), aff'd per curiam, 30 Pa. D.&C.2d 86 (1962).
8. See People v. Allen, 368 Ill. 368, 14 N.E.2d 397 (1938), appeal dismissed, 308
U.S. 511 (1939), citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 748 (Smith-Hurd 1935) (current version
at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5 (Smith-Hurd 1970)); State v. Soucie, 234 Ind. 98, 123
N.E.2d 888 (1955), citing IND. CODE ANN. § 9-1403 (Burns 1942) (current version at
IND. CODE ANN. §35-1-27-1 (Burns 1975)).
9. 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
10. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
11. Id. at 226. In Klopfer, the defendant contended that an entry of a nolle
prosequi with leave order would deprive him of his constitutional right to a speedy
trial. Id. at 218. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that such an order would violate
the purposes of the sixth amendment guarantee of a speedy trial. Id. at 221-22.
12. 398 U.S. 30 (1970). In Dickey, seven years elapsed between the time the
defendant was charged with armed robbery and the time at which he was brought to
trial. Id. The defendant, although incarcerated, was available for prosecution at all
times. Id. at 36. The Supreme Court held that, absent a tenable reason for such delay,
the defendant's sixth amendment rights were violated and that the judgment against
the defendant must be vacated. Id. at 38.
13. Id. at 40-41 (Brennan, J., concurring).
14. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
15. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
16. 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
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defining the constitutional requirements of speedy trial. Marion set
the commencement of the right to speedy trial at the time a
complaint is filed or the person is arrested, i.e., when the suspect has
become an "accused."' 17 Barker laid down the fundamental factors to
be weighed in determining whether there had been a violation of the
right. These factors are the length of the delay, the reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the
defendant.' 8 The Barker Court indicated that until there was some
delay which, because of length, is presumptively prejudicial, there is
no need to examine and balance the other factors. 19 A theme that
was to become the bulwark of the Pennsylvania rule 1100 decision
was enunciated in Barker: "A defendant has no duty to bring
himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of
insuring that the trial is consistent with due process." 20 Nevertheless, the Court indicated that a failure by the defendant to assert his
right would make it difficult for him to prove he was denied a speedy
trial. 21 Barker was a first, definitive attempt to outline the scope of
the right of speedy trial, but it still did not give a precise time frame
within which the right had to be asserted and after which a violation
of the right would occur. Strunk directed the dismissal of charges as
22
the sanction for violation of the right.
In 1972, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v.
Hamilton,23 found the tests enumerated in Barker2 4 and the then
"two-term rule" 25 totally inadequate to meet the speedy trial
problems 26 and enunciated the outlines of what was to become rule
1100,27 a flexible rule with objective certainty. 28 With such a rule, the
Hamilton court felt, there would be less confusion over what
constitutes prejudicial delay and better planning could be arranged
by court administrators as well as attorneys for prosecution and
defense. 29 In addition, the rule would apply to all defendants - not
only to incarcerated defendants - as the old two-term rule did.30 Not
17.
18.
19.
20.
infra.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

404 U.S. at 320.
407 U.S. at 530.
Id.
Id. at 527 (footnotes omitted). See notes 99 & 139 and accompanying text
407
412
449
See
PA.

U.S. at 532. See text accompanying note 74 infra.
U.S. at 440 (1973).
Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127 (1972).
text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 781 (Purdon 1964). The two-term rule provided, inter

alia, for a defendant's discharge if not brought to trial within two terms of the court.
Id.
26.
27.
28.
29.

449 Pa. at 305-09, 297
Id. at 308-09, 297 A.2d
449 Pa. at 308-09, 297
Id. at 308, 297 A.2d at

A.2d at 131-33.
at 132-33. For the text of rule 1100, see note 2 supra.
A.2d at 132-33.
132.
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the least of the court's considerations was the benefit to society of
swifter justice. 31 The Hamilton court was suggesting the imposition
of a strict duty on all parties to the justice system. 32 Henceforth the
courts would have to arrange their affairs to accommodate the trials
within a specific time period, 33 the prosecutors could no longer
exercise dilatory tactics to gain an advantage, 34 and a defendant
would go to trial, whether he asked to do so or not.
On June 8, 1973, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercised its
supervisory and rulemaking power, under the Pennsylvania Constitution 35 and promulgated Rule 1100 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure.3 6 This rule provides a specific time period
within which a defendant must be tried after he has been "charged"
with a crime.3 7 This delineates the heretofore vague concept of
"speedy trial" and insures, through the sanction of dismissal of
charges, that those involved in the criminal justice system provide
38
the means for compliance.
III.

PHANTOM FEAR

An early and widely felt fear was that the criminal case backlog
was so great that rule 1100 would have the effect of a general
amnesty and dump criminals back onto the streets. The fear has
proved baseless.
A very simple statistical survey of the experience in the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas indicates that of the 11,246
cases which were disposed of by the court during 1974, a total of 24
cases were dismissed on the basis of a violation of rule 1100.39 In
1975, only 146 cases were dismissed as a result of violations of rule
30. Id. at 304-09, 297 A.2d at 130-33 (by implication). See note 25 supra.
31. 449 Pa. at 306-08, 297 A.2d at 131-33.
32. Id. at 308, 297 A.2d at 133. The court noted that "a mandatory time
requirement will act as a stimulant to those entrusted with the responsibility of
managing court calendars." Id.
33. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 450, 454, 361 A.2d 870, 872
(1976).
34. The rule was clearly designed to eliminate situations like the one that
occurred in Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 431 Pa. 536, 246 A.2d 430 (1968). In
DiPasquale, the defendant was kept in jail during six continuances while the
prosecutor kept to himself the fact that he had no evidence. Id. at 538, 246 A.2d at 431.
The court stated that, under these circumstances, a granting of a dismissal or a nolle
prosequi would violate the defendant's speedy trial rights. Id. at 542, 246 A.2d at 433.
35. Article 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "The
Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing practice,
procedure and the conduct of all courts." PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(c).
36. Order of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rescinding old rule of criminal
procedure 1100 and adopting new rule 1100 in lieu thereof (June 8, 1973).
37. For the text of rule 1100, see note 2 supra.
38. See id.
39. These statistics were obtained from the Administrative Office of the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. These figures do not include cases where
dismissal had been denied and appeals taken on the question.
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1100 out of the 9,464 cases disposed. 40 The year 1976 showed a
similar result wherein 141 cases were dismissed under the provisions
of rule 1100 out of 10,236 cases disposed during the entire year. 41 In
1977, only 90 cases had been dismissed under rule 1100, out of 8,739
cases disposed of by the court.42 Statistically, rule 1100 strictures
upon the criminal justice system in Philadelphia have clearly not
been devastating to the operations of the court from an administrative viewpoint. 43 Significantly, 1977 shows a sharp decline in the
numbers of cases being dropped out of the system under rule 1100. 4 4
It is also important to review briefly the types of cases not
determined on the merits due to their removal from the system by
operation of rule 1100. The 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1977 charges that
were dismissed were as follows:
TABLE 1
1976

Murder
Robbery
Aggravated Assault
Simple Assault
Burglary
Theft (not auto)
Auto Theft
Embezzlement/Fraud
Receiving Stolen Property
Forgery/Counterfeiting
Rape, Attempted Rape,
Statutory Rape, Indecent
Assault
Commercial Vice
Other Sex Offenses
Possession of Narcotics
Sale Narcotics
Other Drug Offenses
Weapons Offenses
Driving While Intoxicated
Motor Vehicle Offenses
Vagrancy
Arson
Offenses Against the
Public Justice
Prison Breach
Trespassing
Offenses Against the Public
Morals/Policy
Totals
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

2
45
20
4
15
18
3
0
3
1

9
1
1
11
0
1
4
1
0
0
0

(Indecent Assault)

2
0
0

0

3

1

24

146

142

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Table 1 infra; text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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These statistics demonstrate that the efforts to obtain a speedy
trial have been successful to an overwhelming degree. 45 It is also
significant that for those offenses involving crimes against the
person, i.e., murder, rape, robbery and assault, the number of
dismissals in 1977 is almost de minimus. Through the efforts of the
courts and the prosecutors, the favorable results obtained have
alleviated the fears of early prognosticators that large numbers of
serious cases would go untried and dangerous people would be
placed back onto the street without a determination of guilt or
innocence. Even though rule 1100 has provided a viable method for
dealing with speedy trial problems, there remain some significant
difficulties which need remedy.
IV.

THE COUNTDOWN

At first blush, it would appear that rule 1100 was a trial judge's
dream. If the judge could count to 270 before July 1, 1974, and only
count to 180 after July 1, 1974, the speedy trial problems which had
plagued the court would disappear. 46 However, nothing in the law is
so simple that a mere counting system could resolve such an elusive
right as that of "speedy trial" and resolve it to the benefit of both the
individual defendant and society's interest in the prompt disposition
of criminal cases. Problems arose in the implementation of the rule
in the courtroom setting almost immediately. The initial question
was the point from which the rule commences to run - when do you
start the count?
The most obvious provision of rule 1100 is that a trial shall
commence within 270 days from the date on which a written
complaint is filed after June 30, 1973 and before July 1, 1974, and
within 180 days for all complaints filed on July 1, 1974 or
47
thereafter.
The rule applies to trials in a court case "in which a written
complaint" is filed. 48 However, not every case starts with the filing
of a written complaint. A sight arrest may precede a filing of written
charges; perhaps not by much time, but a calendar day's difference
between 11:50 P.M. and 12:10 A.M. requires a determination of the
start-up date. Conversely, a written complaint may be filed and the
defendant not arrested until weeks, months, or even years later. The
45. See notes 39-44 and accompanying text supra.
46. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(a)(1), (2). For the text of these sections of the rule, see
note 2 supra.
47. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(a)(1), (2). See note 2 supra.The rule was to be prospective
only. Commonwealth v. Brown, 470 Pa. 274, 368 A.2d 626 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Coffey, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 49, 53, 331 A.2d 829, 832 (1974).
48. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(a)(1).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 2

1977-1978]

WORKING WITH RULE

1100

threshold question in these cases is whether to commence the time
period on the date of the filing of written complaint, as the section
would seem to direct, or on the date of the arrest of the person
charged. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has reasoned that rule
1100 means what it says, and that it is the complaint which triggers
49
the start.
Other jurisdictions use different commencement signposts. In
Illinois, the speedy trial time runs 120 days from date of arrest.50 In
California, the period in which trial must commence is forty-five
days after arraignment. 51 Louisiana has held that the date of
indictment is the "institution of prosecution" from which trial
periods are to be measured. 52 One commentator has observed:
Generally, courts have considered four points in the criminal
process at which the guarantee [to a speedy trial] might begin:
(1) when the alleged crime is committed; (2) when the government decides to prosecute and has enough evidence to proceed
against an individual; (3) when a defendant is arrested; and (4)
when he is formally
charged with a crime, either by indictment
53
or information.
The Pennsylvania rule, 54 commencing from the filing of charges
against the individual would fall within the second option listed
5
above. It gives an individual protection against pretrial delay
much earlier than the Louisiana rule which, by defining indictment
as the "institution of prosecution," provides no protection during the
period between arrest and indictment.56 Rule 1100 prevents overlong
pretrial incarceration and the concomitant impairment of defense
49. Commonwealth v. Flores, - Pa. Super. Ct. -,
371 A.2d 1366 (1977). For a
discussion of Flores, see notes 83-86 and accompanying text infra.
50. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
51. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1972).
52. State v. Gladden, 260 La. 735, 742-43, 257 So. 2d 388, 391 (1972), appeal
dismissed for lack of juris., 410 U.S. 920 (1973).
53. Comment, The Speedy Trial Guarantee: Criteria and Confusion in Interpreting Its Violation, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 839, 857 (1973).
54. See note 2 supra.
55. Rule 1100 does not, however, provide a defendant with any protection against
delay in the period before arrest. This protection is, of course, afforded by the general
statute of limitations on all crimes. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966),
where the Supreme Court observed that there is no constitutional right to be arrested.
Id. at 310. Preprosecution delay generally is controlled only by the appropriate statute
of limitations. United States v. Feinberg, 383 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1967). However, some
courts, on a case-by-case basis, have dismissed prosecutions where preprosecution
delay cheated the defendant of his ability to reconstruct the happenings of the
particular day on which the crime was committed. Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210,
215 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (seven month delay between alleged sale of narcotics and
swearing out of complaint held unreasonably prejudicial to defendant).
56. See note 52 supra.
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preparation. At the same time, it provides for a reasonably speedy
conclusion to the matter, so that society's interest in finality of the
case is protected.
Pennsylvania uses as a trigger for the countdown the "filing of a
written complaint";5 7 however, this point is not always clear. For
example, in Commonwealth v. Mumich,55 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court ruled that the time period commences to run upon the filing of
a proper complaint, not a defective one that has been dismissed. 59
Mumich, a close reading of the case discloses, had failed to object to
the dismissal of the first complaint. ° The majority in Mumich felt
that the defendant's lack of objection to the dismissal was
tantamount to an agreement to an extension of the rule 1100 run
date.6 1 A well-reasoned dissent in that case states that, had Mumich
done so and demanded amendment to the original complaint, rather
than acquiescing in the dismissal, the period would have been
62
calculated from date of first complaint.
In Commonwealth v. Silver,63 the superior court dealt with a
case that did not begin as a result of the filing of a written complaint
as prescribed in the initial phrase of rule 1100(a). 64 A special
investigating grand jury had returned a presentment, 65 i.e., a
recommendation for prosecution, which was subsequently submitted

57. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(a)(1), (2).
58. 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 209, 361 A.2d 359 (1976).

59. Id. at 213, 361 A.2d at 361.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 214, 361 A.2d at 362 (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
63. 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 221, 357 A.2d 612 (1976).
64. For the text of this section of the rule, see note 2 supra. The manner in which
an accused is brought within the court's jurisdiction is set forth and analyzed in
Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d 764 (1971). Typically in
Pennsylvania, a defendant is arrested on a written complaint, has a preliminary
hearing and, if held, an indictment is prepared against him on which he is tried. Id. at
130, 277 A.2d at 770-71. (This procedure has been varied in Philadelphia by the
extinction of indicting grand juries since December 1975 so that in Philadelphia an
information, prepared by the district attorney, takes the place of the indictment by an
indicting grand jury. See notes 69 & 70 infra.) There are, however, two exceptions to
this arrest-preliminary hearing procedure. Firstly, where there is a need for haste, the
district attorney, under the supervision of the court, may dispense with the complaint
and preliminary hearing and immediately prepare an information against the
defendant. Id. at 130, 277 A.2d at 771. Secondly, where a grand jury has made a
presentment that an individual or individuals be prosecuted, without actually
indicting the person or persons, the district attorney may prepare an information
against the accused directly without resort to a prior preliminary hearing. Id. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Levinson, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 412, 362 A.2d 1080 (1976).
65. 238 Pa. Super. Ct. at 221, 357 A.2d at 613. A presentment is a summary of a
grand jury investigation containing recommendations that individuals be formally
accused. These recommendations must be acted upon by an indicting grand jury in
order to obtain an indictment on which the defendant can be brought to trial. See L.
ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 157-58 (1947). For the
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to an indicting grand jury. 66 The court held that the presentment
issued by the investigating grand jury did not start the prompt trial
clock running but that the submission of the presentment to the
indicting grand jury did.6 7 Since Philadelphia has elected to abolish
indicting grand juries, 68 presumably there the clock will start upon
the filing of informations 69 by the prosecution after a presentment is
70
filed by an investigating grand jury.
Another countdown problem that confronts a calendar judge
with some frequency occurs when a defendant has initially been
discharged at a preliminary hearing as the result of a successful
challenge and is later rearrested on the same charges. In some
discharge situations, the defendant has actively and successfully

sought the dismissal of charges because of insufficient evidence.7 1 In
the intervening time, the prosecution may develop additional
evidence and rearrest the defendant. The question a court must
resolve is whether to count from the initial complaint or to start

anew when the charges are lodged again. This situation is far
different from those cases in which the commonwealth withdraws a
prosecution - nolle prosequi - only to attempt to reinstate the same
prosecution. Both this withdrawal and the reinstatement must be
procedure in Philadelphia where indicting grand juries have been abolished, see note
70 infra.
Some characteristics of the grand jury system in Pennsylvania have been
explained thusly:
Grand juries are generally referred to as either being indicting or investigating.
Of the investigating grand juries, there are two types: (1) an indicting grand jury
which is charged by the court to undertake an investigation; (2) or a grand jury
specifically summoned to serve for the purpose of investigation only.
Segal, Spivack & Costilo, Obtaininga Grand Jury Investigation in Pennsylvania, 35
TEMP. L.Q. 73, 77 n.32a (1961), citing Bell, The Several Modes of Instituting Criminal
Proceedings in Pennsylvania, 13 Pa. Dist. Rep. 815 (1904). See In re Investigation of
January 1974 Philadelphia Grand Jury, 458 Pa. 586, 595 n.4, 328 A.2d 485, 489 n.4
(1974); Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 185 A.2d 135 (1962).
66. 238 Pa. Super. Ct. at 223, 357 A.2d at 613. An indictment is generally drawn
by the district attorney and requires the approval of an indicting grand jury. For the
changes in this procedure necessitated by the abolition of indicting grand juries in
Philadelphia, see note 70 infra. The grand jury examines the evidence in support of
the indictment and, if it agrees that the allegations are correct, a true bill will be
returned on which the defendant will be tried. See L. ORFIELD, supra note 65.
67. 238 Pa. Super. Ct. at 230, 357 A.2d at 616.
68. The last indicting grand juries in Philadelphia sat in December, 1975, after
the voters had elected to abolish indicting grand juries in the county, pursuant to the
Pennsylvania Constitution. See PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
69. An information is a formal written accusation prepared and approved by the
district attorney without any grand jury consideration. See L. ORFIELD, supra note 65.
70. Since the voters of Philadelphia elected to dispense with indicting grand
juries, the district attorney has had to act on the recommendations in the presentment
and file an information with the court in order that the defendant be formally charged
and brought to trial. See id.
71. Discharges most commonly result from defendants' challenges to complaints
on the grounds that they are defective or that the prosecution has failed to present a
prima facie case at a preliminary hearing.
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done with court approval.7 2 In these situations, as in Mumich,73 if
the defendant fails to object to the dismissal of charges and demand
a speedy trial, the defendant could be considered to have waived his
7
speedy trial rights. 4

The American Bar Association Project on Standards for
Criminal Justice (ABA Standards) 75 includes a section entitled
"When time commences to run" which states:
The time for trial should commence running, without
demand by the defendant, as follows:
(b) if the charge was dismissed upon motion of the
defendant and thereafter the defendant was held to answer or
charged with an offense, from the date the defendant was so
held to answer or charged, as above .... 76
This would indicate that the preferred method would be to start the
clock running at the time of filing of the second charge. A study
comparing Pennsylvania law and practice to these ABA Standards, 77 found no comparable provision in Pennsylvania criminal
procedure rules, and the comment to that study recommended
promulgation of such a rule. 78 In this vacuum, most trial courts faced
with the problem, wherever possible and out of an abundance of
caution, have given a literal reading to rule 1100(a) and started the
79
rule 1100 clock running from the filing of the first complaint.
However, a different result would have to follow if the dismissal
came close to the time of the run date and a rearrest occurred after
the time had already run.
The pragmatic result to counting from the first filing of the
complaint will require the prosecution to move swiftly to develop its
case and renew the charge. Of course, this approach also may put a
burden on the courts to try the case within a very short time after the
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 492 (Purdon 1964). Granting of a nolle prosequi is
within the sound discretion of the court. Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 431 Pa. 536,
541, 246 A.2d 430, 432 (1968). Court approval is necessary for the vacation of a nolle
prosequi. Commonwealth ex rel. Thor v. Ashe, 138 Pa. Super. Ct. 222, 227, 11 A.2d 173,
175 (1940).
73. 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 209, 361 A.2d 359 (1976). For a discussion of Mumich, see
notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra.
74. See Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 349-50, 329 A.2d 258, 266 (1974).
75. ABA STANDARDS, Speedy Trial § 2.1-.3 (1968).
76. Id. § 2.2(b).
77. AN ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS OF THE ABA AND NAT'L
ADVISORY COMM'N WITH PENNSYLVANIA LAW AND PRACTICE, Pretrial and Trial
Procedures, ch. 10 (1976).
78. Id. at 10-22.
79. This conclusion is based upon Judge Marshall's experience as calendar judge
in the Philadelphia homicide program since October 1976.
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second complaint is filed. Since the number of these cases is not very
large, a well-organized system ought to be able to accommodate
them.
Many courts8° begin counting anew upon the second filing - an
approach that conforms to the ABA Standards. 81 This gives the
prosecution an advantage when the defendant was the successful
party initially. In effect, the defendant has won the battle and lost
the war because the prosecution thereby gains additional time to
develop the case and proceed to trial. An amendment to the rule is in
order which could balance competing interests, giving guidance to
the courts in the resolution of a starting date for the countdown.
V. "DUE DILIGENCE"
A corollary problem to the question of the commencement date
under rule 1100 is the mandate of section (c) of the rule that due
diligence is required on the part of the commonwealth to bring the
case to trial within the prescribed time and that no application for
extending the time for commencement of the trial should be granted
82
without a demonstration that such diligence has been exercised.
Three different situations demand "due diligence" by the
commonwealth. The first occurs when the charges are lodged but no
apprehension of the suspect has been made; the second occurs
between the arrest and the prosecution's readiness for trial within
the time period, and the third, the due diligence exercised by the
courts in calling the case for trial.
A. Diligent Apprehension of the Suspect
It is conceivable that 180 days could run before an accused is
apprehended. The issue is whether "due diligence" has been
exercised on the part of the law enforcement officials to apprehend
the accused so as to permit an extension of the period. A recently
decided case, Commonwealth v. Flores,8 3 sheds some light on the
issue. Flores was apprehended by police five days after the written
complaint was filed.8 4 The court explicitly held that the rule 1100
time period begins to run upon the filing of the complaint and not
from the date of the arrest.8 5 The court added that the inability of the
80. Id. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mumich, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 209, 361 A.2d 359
(1976).
81. For the text of pertinent provisions of the ABA Standards, see text

accompanying notes 75 & 76 supra.
82. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(c). For the text of rule 1100, see note 2 supra.
83.

-

Pa. Super. Ct.

84. Id. at
85. Id. at

-,
-,

-,

371 A.2d 1366 (1977).

371 A.2d at 1368.
371 A.2d at 1372-73.
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police to locate and arrest the accused can amount to defendant
unavailability under rule

1100(d)(1).8 6

The foreseeable difficulty with

the Flores ruling will be in measuring how much effort will be
required by law enforcement and court personnel to locate a missing
suspect after charges are lodged to satisfy the due diligence standard
of rule 1100(c), 8 7 thus permitting a court to find that the defendant
8
was, indeed, unavailable within the meaning of rule 1100(d)(1). 8

In this regard, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Mitchell,8 9 has placed on the commonwealth the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the unavailability of a
defendant or his attorney and that due diligence was exercised in
attempting to apprehend or locate the defendant.90 In Mitchell, the
prosecution contended that the defendant had, for a period of time,
avoided arrest despite diligent police effort. 9 1 After examining the
information available to the police and the history of attempts to
locate the defendant, the court agreed only reasonable efforts had to
be made. 92 The court felt it should not be required to second-guess
police efforts to locate accused persons.
At about the same time as Mitchell, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court decided Commonwealth v. Martofel,93 where the court found
the police had obviously not used every conceivable method to
ascertain the defendant's whereabouts. 94 The police had made
numerous checks at the defendant's last known residence and his
last known place of employment. 95 They learned that the defendant
had asked for money in order to leave town. 96 This, the court said,
was reasonable effort sufficient to rule that the defendant had been
unavailable under rule

1100(d)(1). 97

But the question still remains;

how much will be enough police activity to meet the due diligence
requirement?
In order to avoid future difficulties under Mitchell and Martofel,
fugitive cases in the homicide calendar room in Philadelphia are
86. Id. at __,
371 A.2d at 1372. For the text of rule 1100(d)(1), see note 2 supra.
Under this section of the rule, the period of a defendant's or his attorney's
unavailability is excluded from the 180 day count. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(d)(1). See text
accompanying notes 139-58 infra.
87. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(c). For the text of rule 1100(c), see note 2 supra.
88. See notes 139-58 and accompanying text infra.
89. 472 Pa. 553, 372 A.2d 826 (1977).
90. Id. at 564, 372 A.2d at 831.
91. Id. at 563-64, 372 A.2d at 831.
92. Id. at 566, 372 A.2d at 832.
93. Pa. Super. Ct. -_, 375 A.2d 60 (1977).
94. Id. at
, 375 A.2d at 61.
95. Id. at __, 375 A.2d at 60-61.
96. Id. at
, 375 A.2d at 61.
97. Id. at
, 375 A.2d at 61. See note 86 supra. For the text of rule l100(d)(1), see
note 2 supra.
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listed every sixty days, and reports are required, on the record, by
those charged with the responsibility of locating missing defendants. 98 These reports on the activities to locate the missing
defendant during the period insure a record from which due diligence
can later be judged, while at the same time prodding into action
those charged with the responsibility for apprehending the missing
individual.
B.

Due Diligence By The Commonwealth

It is the responsibility of the prosecution to bring an accused to
trial within 180 days. 99 In balancing the speedy trial demands
against the need for adequate trial preparation, section (c) of rule
1100100 affords some flexibility. However, a commonwealth application for additional time under this section can only be granted after
the commonwealth has demonstrated that, despite "due diligence"
on its part, an extension of time is necessary. 1 1 Notwithstanding
section (c)'s rather clear language, two distinct problems have arisen
under it. First, what is "due diligence" and second, who is the
commonwealth?
Due diligence should consist of a reasonably earnest and steady
effort by the prosecution to get its case to trial. The appellate courts
have not yet fully defined the phrase. In Commonwealth v.
Mayfield, 10 2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth a rather strict
standard by saying that due diligence requires the exercise of the
"highest standards of professional responsibility." 10 3 Precisely what
the highest standards are can only be determined on a case by case
basis. As vague as that definition may be, the one thing that is clear
is that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is insisting that close to
every effort be made to bring the case to trial within 180 days, in
conformance with the purpose of the rule.
98. This procedure was instituted by verbal order of Judge Marshall.
99. PA.R. CRIM. P. 1100(a)(2). See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 238 Pa. Super. Ct.
508, 518, 362 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1976); Commonwealth v. Williams, 457 Pa. 502, 327 A.2d
15 (1974).
100. Rule 1100(c) states:
At any time prior to the expiration of the period for commencement of trial, the
attorney for the Commonwealth may apply to the court for an order extending
the time for commencement of trial. A copy of such application shall be served
upon the defendant through his attorney, if any, and the defendant shall also
have the right to be heard thereon. Such application shall be granted only if trial
cannot be commenced within the prescribed period despite due diligence by the
Commonwealth. Any order granting such application shall specify the date or
period within which trial shall be commenced.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(c) (emphasis added).
101. See text accompanying notes 89-97 supra.
102. 469 Pa. 214, 364 A.2d 1345 (1976). For a discussion of Mayfield, see notes
126-33 and accompanying text infra.
103. 469 Pa. at 222, 364 A.2d at 1349.
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This attitude was highlighted in Commonwealth v. Martin.10 4
Martin had a complaint lodged against him in Lycoming County at
a time when he was incarcerated in Bradford County, a fact known
to the Lycoming prosecutor. 10 5 No effort was made to bring him into
Lycoming County for four months.10 6 Upon a motion to extend under
rule 1100(c),10 7 the commonwealth claimed that the defendant had

been "unavailable" while in Bradford County. The court did not
agree and held that the prosecution should have made early efforts
to have Martin brought into the jurisdiction. 0 8 Measured by the high
standards of Mayfield it is apparent that the prosecutor did not meet
his professional responsibility when he failed to move for Martin's
return.
The highest degree of professional responsibility does not
require clairvoyance, however, as is illustrated by the almost farcical
factual situation in Commonwealth v. Clark.10 9 Clark was on bail
awaiting trial when, unbeknown to the prosecution, he was arrested
on a second unrelated charge and committed to the county jail. ' 10 At
the time the initial case was called for trial, the prosecutor advised
the court that Clark was a fugitive, even though, at that very time,
he was residing in the prosecutor's county jail."' The court sent the
case back for a further hearing, noting that the mere fact that a
defendant was in jail within the county at the time his case was
called does not mean he was "available." As the court said, he could
have been hiding himself in some crevice of the system, and failure
to find him under those circumstances would not violate the "highest
2
degree of professional responsibility" standard."
A case close to Clark is Commonwealth v. Woodson. 1 3 In
Woodson, the defendant was in the county jail at the same time the
104. 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 407, 371 A.2d 903 (1977).
105. Id. at 410-11, 371 A.2d at 904.
106. Id. at 411, 371 A.2d at 904.
107. Five days before the expiration of the 180 day period, the commonwealth filed for
an extension. Id. at 409, 371 A.2d at 903-04. The commonwealth claimed it could not
locate the defendant and could not try him, if found, until ten days after arraignment. Id.
at 409, 371 A.2d at 904, citing PA. R. CRIM. P. 317(b). Defendant refused to waive ten day
arraignment rule. 246 Pa. Super. Ct. at 410., 371 A.2d at 904. The court granted the
commonwealth an extension. Id. Defendant was convicted and appealed to the superior
court. Id. The superior court reversed the lower court and discharged the appellant, Id. at
412, 371 A.2d at 905.
108. 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 410-12, 371 A.2d at 904-05.
109. Pa. Super. Ct. __,
374 A.2d 1380 (1977).
110. Id. at
, 374 A.2d at 1381.

111. Id.
112. Id. at __,
374 A.2d at 1382. On remand, the question for determination is
when did the prosecutor become aware of the defendant's whereabouts. Id. Once the
prosecutor becomes aware of defendant's location, the defendant cannot be said to be

"unavailable." Id.
113.

-

Pa. Super. Ct.

__,

375 A.2d 375 (1977).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 2

1977-1978]

WORKING WITH RULE

1100

prosecutor was reporting him as a fugitive to the court.' 1 4 In
Woodson, however, unlike Clark, the court found that the failure on
the part of the prosecutor to know this was attributable to "internal
disarray" of the prosecutor's office and thus the prosecutor's
ignorance was not grounds for an extension.1 15
From the cases already decided, it does appear clear that the
appellate courts will require those responsible to utilize available
technology, e.g., fingerprint checks, N.C.I.C., 116 and computerized
criminal extracts. A failure to do so would be exercising less than the
"highest degree of professional responsibility" and, consequently,
would not be "due diligence."
A more vexing question than what constitutes due diligence is
who is the "Commonwealth?" Historically, moving a case to trial
has been within the control of the district attorney.' 17 Logically then,
rule 1100, whose main thrust is expediting cases to trial, should be
directed to the prosecution; the "Commonwealth" referred to in rule
1100(c) 18 was obviously intended to mean the prosecution. Two early
decisions by the Pennsylvania Superior Court put the identity of the
"Commonwealth" in issue. 119 In Commonwealth v. Shelton,120 the
prosecutor did not move for an extension before the time period
prescribed by rule 1100 had elapsed.12 1 The case had not been
scheduled for trial within the period because the trial court could not
resolve pretrial motions fast enough. Because the delay was not
attributable to the prosecution, the trial court reasoned that it was
excludable time, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, and
permitted interlocutory appeal.' 22 The Pennsylvania Superior Court,
possibly feeling that a loophole in rule 1100 was beginning to
develop, observed that it made no difference whether the delay was
23
occasioned because of the prosecutor or because of the judiciary.'
So long as the delay was not of the defendant's making, the court
reasoned that he was entitled to a dismissal if not brought to trial
114. Id. at
115. Id. at

-,

__,

375 A.2d at 376.
375 A.2d at 375.

116. The National Crime Information Center (N.C.I.C.) is a data bank which
cooperates with all police departments throughout the country, storing and providing

information on fugitives, stolen vehicles and other identifiable property.

117. See L. ORFIELD, supra note 65, at 383-84; Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa.
214, 218, 364 A.2d 1345, 1347 (1976).
118. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(c). For the text of this section, see note 2 supra.
119. Commonwealth v. Shelton, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 195, 361 A.2d 873, affd, 469 Pa.
8, 364 A.2d 694 (1976); Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 279, 362 A.2d
994 (1976).
120. 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 195, 361 A.2d 873 (1976).
121. Id. at 202, 361 A.2d at 877. The 270 day limit was applicable in Shelton under
rule 1100(a)(1) since the written complaint was filed on January 3, 1974. Id. at 198, 361
A.2d at 874. For the text of rule 1100(a)(1), see note 2 supra.
122. See id. at 199-200, 361 A.2d at 875.
123. Id. at 207, 361 A.2d at 879.
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within the prescribed period. 124 Clearly, the court viewed the term
"Commonwealth" in a broad sense to include the judiciary. Shelton
125
was appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Paralleling Shelton was the case of Commonwealth v. Mayfield.1 26 In Mayfield, the prosecutor had asked for an extension prior
to the expiration of the rule 1100 run date. The reason for his request
was the court administrator's inability to schedule trial within the
180 day period.1 27 Before the extension request was heard, 180 days
had elapsed and defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court
granted an extension to the prosecution and denied the defendant's
motion.' 28 Enlarging upon its-previous Shelton ruling, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court and held that not only
was judicial delay not excludable time, but it could not even be the
12 9
basis for a timely extension request.
Mayfield, too, was appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
which handed down its decisions on both Shelton and Mayfield on
the same day.' 30 The two supreme court decisions have to be read
together. When this is done, they provide the following instructions
to the trial courts:
1. Judicial delay is not excludable from the rule 1100 period.

31

2. Although not excludable, judicial delay can be the basis for a
32
motion to extend the run date, if filed within the rule 1100 period.
3. From Mayfield on, for judicial delay to be the basis of an
extension, there must be a showing on the record that the delay was
justified.'

33

Even before Mayfield and Shelton were decided by the supreme
court, it was apparent that it was the trial court's responsibility to
control the criminal calendar. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in
Commonwealth v. Coleman,' 34 made it abundantly clear that the

124. Id. at 200-03, 361 A.2d at 876-77.
125. Shelton was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 469 Pa. 8, 19, 364

A.2d 694, 700 (1976).
126. 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 279, 362 A.2d 994 (1976). See text accompanying notes 102 &
103 supra.
127. 239 Pa. Super. Ct. at 280, 362 A.2d at 995.

128. Id.
129. Id. at 280-81, 362 A.2d at 996. For a discussion of the holding in Shelton, see
text accompanying notes 120-25 supra.
130. Both supreme court appeals were decided on October 8, 1976. 469 Pa. 8, 364
A.2d 694 & 469 Pa. 214, 364 A.2d 1345 (1976).
131. 469 Pa. at 19, 364 A.2d at 699.
132. Id. at 17, 364 A.2d at 698.
133. 469 Pa. at 222, 364 A.2d at 1349-50.
134. 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 450, 361 A.2d 870 (1976).
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trial court is obliged to change its procedures to comply with the
requirements of rule 1100.135
In Philadelphia, the responsibility has been accepted and
substantial administrative personnel, computer equipment and
programming have been committed to the task of following cases
from their inception. The homicide calendar judge hears all rule 1100
matters dealing with homicide cases. Other judges hear such
motions on all other criminal cases. An estimate of time for handling
of these matters in Philadelphia alone is sixty to seventy-five
judicial hours per week. 136 By the results indicated in the statistics
set forth earlier,137 the hours are well spent.
What consitutes "Commonwealth" in relation to the speedy trial
problems is obviously an evolving concept. Judicial delay, initially
believed to be outside the purview of the sanctions imposed by the
rule, has now been moved into the orbit of the rule.138 As long as the
delay is not on the part of the defendant himself, delay by any other
component of government inures to the defendant's benefit.
VI.

UNAVAILABILITY OF THE DEFENDANT

OR

His

ATTORNEY

The appellate courts have been extremely consistent in main-

1 39
taining that a defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial;

moving the case to trial is the function of the prosecutor and the
court.1 40 Nevertheless, rule 1100 recognizes that there are situations
where, despite the diligent efforts of the prosecutor and the court,
4
there can be no prompt trial because the defendant is unavailable.' '
Where the defendant or his attorney is unavailable, there is no
need to move for an extension of the 180 day period. The time of
135. Id. at 454, 361 A.2d at 872.
136. This estimate is based on the assignment of judicial manpower necessary to
handle rule 1100 matters in the homicide felony-jury and felony-nonjury program in
Philadelphia.
137. See Table 1 and text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
138. See text accompanying notes 131-33 supra.
139. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Adams, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 452, 456-57, 352 A.2d
97, 99 (1975). This is not to suggest that the defendant can take advantage of rule 1100
without objecting to a trial date being set beyond the period of the rule. See
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 473 Pa. 400, 374 A.2d 1274 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Hickson, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 496, 344 A.2d 617 (1975). Accord, Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514 (1972). See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
140. See notes 99 & 117 and accompanying text supra.
141. Rule 1100(d) states:
In determining the period for commencement of trial, there shall be excluded
therefrom such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from:
(1) the unavailability of the defendant or his attorney; (2) any continuance
in excess of thirty (30) days granted at the request of the defendant or his
attorney, provided that only the period beyond the thirtieth (30th) day shall
be so excluded.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(d). See text accompanying notes 86, 88 & 90-97 supra.
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unavailability is excluded ipso facto from the computation. 142 Be this
as it may, this portion of the rule has spawned its share of cases

dealing with what constitutes unavailability.

143
Clearly, flight to avoid prosecution is a form of unavailability.

This is not to suggest that the commonwealth need not exercise
diligence in trying to apprehend the fugitive.' 44 Likewise, a
defendant or his counsel is considered unavailable if either is engaged
in another trial at the time the case is called for trial.145 The
unavailability of a codefendant or his counsel does not provide an
excludable period of time unless there is affirmative evidence on the
record that the defendant or his attorney agreed to the delay. The
146
reason for this is that the right to speedy trial is a personal one
and the commonwealth could sever the cases for trial. 1 47 Although
the time during which the codefendant is unavailable is not
1 48
excludable, it can be the basis for an extension.

Interestingly enough, "no counsel" is not equivalent to "unavailable counsel." This is so because it is a court function to see that the

defendant has counsel when he is unable to obtain counsel in his
own behalf.' 49 Although no case has arisen on this specific point, the
failure of a financially able defendant to hire counsel should not be
construed as "unavailable counsel" for rule 1100 purposes. 5° Even in

that situation, the court would presumably be under a duty to
appoint counsel to keep the defendant from frustrating the speedy
15
trial mandate. '

An infrequent but difficult problem for a trial judge under rule
1100 is unavailability because of incompetency. Incompetency of the
R. CRIM. P. ll00(d)(1).
143. Commonwealth v. Flores,
142. PA.

-

Pa. Super Ct.

_

371 A.2d 1366 (1977);

Commonwealth v. Haynes, 245 Pa. Super. Ct. 17, 369 A.2d 271 (1976).
144. See notes 83-116 and accompanying text supra.
145. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 212, 219-20, 361 A.2d 862,
866-67 (1976) (Cercone, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Reese, 237 Pa. Super. Ct.
326, 331, 352 A.2d 143, 145-46 (1975).
146. See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 196, 369 A.2d 879 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 397, 364 A.2d 330 (1976); Commonwealth
v. Hagans, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 393, 364 A.2d 328 (1976).
147. PA. R. CRIM. P. 228(d).
148. See cases cited note 145 supra.
149. PA. R. CRIM. P. 303. Commonwealth v. Williams, 457 Pa. 502, 508-09, 327 A.2d
15, 18 (1974), citing ABA STANDARDS, Speedy Trial § 1.1 (1968) and ABA STANDARDS,
The Function of the Trial Judge § 3.8 (1972).
150. See Commonwealth v. Wade, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 454, 360 A.2d 752 (1976) (delay
precipitated by court-appointed counsel's scheduling problems is not excludable under
rule 1100 when due diligence not exercised by the commonwealth), aff'd, Pa. -'
380 A.2d 782 (1977).
151. Courts obviously have the power to appoint counsel or even additional
counsel. That power is not dependent upon the indigency of the defendant. Although
it is an open question, there may be a duty to appoint counsel where a defendant's
speedy trial right might otherwise be frustrated. Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 834 n.46 (1975).
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defendant has raised an anomalous situation - while on one hand,
he must be given a speedy trial, so long as he is incompetent he can
152
be given no trial at all.

Subject to the limiting provisions of the Mental Health and
Procedures Act, 153 all that the system can do is wait until such time
as the defendant becomes competent to stand trial. After a
suggestion of incompetency, the court may order an examination of
the defendant and, after a hearing resulting in a finding that
defendant is incompetent, have the defendant committed to an
appropriate facility for treatment. 54 A fifteen year delay has
155
withstood a speedy trial attack under these circumstances.
An area of some concern to the trial judge is the interim period
between the suggestion of defendant's incompetency and its official
determination. This period encompasses the initial suggestion of
incompetency, a study of the individual, and an evidentiary
hearing. 56 It is not unusual for this series of events to take ninety
days or more before there is a resolution of the competency question.
Since the defendant has not been declared incompetent during these
procedures, the speedy trial time period continues to run. If he is
ultimately declared incompetent, the rule 1100 problem is avoided
since he was obviously unavailable ab initio. If the court finds him
competent, a real rule 1100 problem exists since the rule makes no
provision for excluding the examination period. 57
The ABA Standards, on the other hand, enumerate as one of the
excludable periods of time delay resulting from proceedings
concerning examination and hearing on competency as well as any
period of actual incompetency.1 58 This portion of the ABA Standards
would be preferable to rule 1100 from the viewpoint of calendar
administration. It would obviate the motions and hearings for
extensions of the rule 1100 run date in these instances.

152. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d
582 (D.C. Cir. 1955), vacated and remanded per curiam, 350 U.S. 961 (1956);
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 451 Pa. 483, 305 A.2d 890 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Reese, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 326, 352 A.2d 143 (1975).
153. Mental Health Procedures Act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7503 (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1978-79). Limiting provisions include § 7402(a) (person cannot be tried,
convicted, or sentenced during incompetency), § 7403(b) (stay of actions) and § 7404
(bifurcated trial to determine criminal responsibility).
154. See Commonwealth v. McQuaid, 464 Pa. 499, 347 A.2d 465 (1975).
155. Id. In McQuaid, the court found that a 15 year delay, due to defendant's
incompetence, did not violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Id. at 518-22, 347
A.2d at 475-77.
156. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7403-7404 (Purdon Cum Supp. 1978-79).
157. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(d). For the text of rule 1100(d), see note 2 supra.
158. See ABA STANDARDS, Speedy Trial § 2.3(a) (1968).
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In light of the experience with the unavailability exclusion, it
behooves the prosecution to request a timely extension in any
questionable case, rather than simply relying on an automatic
exclusion.
VII. NEW TRIALS
It is, of course, entirely logical that less time be given to effecting
the commencement of a retrial thafi the trial. After all, both sides
have tried the case on a previous occasion. Consequently, the rule
directs that where a new trial has been ordered, it shall commence
159
within 120 days, rather than 180 days, after the remand.
As clear as the language is, a mechanical difficulty in applying
the rule has developed. The trial court is generally unaware of the
remand date as recorded on the appellate court docket until the file is
physically returned to the trial court. Experience has shown that
this can take as long as several weeks. This weak link effectively
robs the criminal justice system of whatever time it takes to transmit
the files. It further shortens an already shortened period. Even
though the resultant delay is attributable to the lack of administrative efficiency, it is an unanswered question whether the failure to
prod the administrative personnel of the appellate court to return the
files to the trial court with dispatch is a lack of due diligence on the
part of the commonwealth. In light of Mayfield and Shelton,
however, it may be that administrative delay cannot be the basis for
60
a motion to extend the time period.'
A simple solution would be an amendment to the rule setting as
the commencement of the period the date on which the file is
returned to the trial court rather than the date of the remand by the
appellate court. This solution, however, would have the effect of
taking some of the pressure off the criminal justice system to move
with dispatch at every level. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
shown a reluctance to alleviate any of this pressure and seems to be
committed to the management principle of letting the workload push
6
the people.' '
Even in situations where the trial court itself grants a new
trial,'16 2 there is time slippage because of the mechanical difficulties
of file transfers and effecting notice of the granting of the new trial.
159. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(e). For the text of rule 1100(e), see note 2 supra.
160. For a discussion of Shelton and Mayfield, see notes 121-25 & 126-29 and
accompanying text supra.
161. See id.
162. In Philadelphia, mistrials are treated as the equivalent of trials granted by
the trial court for rule 1100 purposes and the retrial period is set for 120 days.
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In those jurisdictions where the original trial judge would hear the
case again, there is no problem of commencement of the retrial
period. The judge knows when he granted the new trial and can
easily begin the count. However, where the case is to be reassigned
through a calendar room or other administrative entity, it may be
weeks before information is received concerning the granting of the
new trial.
To expect rule 1100 to make some accommodation for what can
only be described as inadequate intra-office communication would be
expecting too much. Lack of such accommodation means that the
prosecution and the court must be extremely alert in their case
management of retrials.
VIII.

CONTINUANCES

By

DEFENDANTS

Time is, of course, critical to defense trial preparation. Cases
vary in complexity and more problems arise in some than others. To
accommodate these preparation contingencies, rule 1100(d)(2) allows
that the 180 day period will not include "any continuance in excess
of thirty (30) days granted at the request of the defendant or his
attorney, provided that only the period beyond the thirtieth (30th)
1
day shall be so excluded."

63

There is nothing in either the rule 1100 provisions or case law to
suggest that the continuances referred to in subsection (d)(2) can be
had without defendant first showing some good cause. Even with
this prologue, it is still difficult to discern the rationale behind the
"free" thirty-day continuance. Until this year, most trial courts
accumulated continuances sought by the defense.16 4 The run date
clock continued to move during the first thirty days but anything
after a total of thirty days was excludable and, therefore, extended
the run date. For example, a defendant who sought three continuances of fifteen days each would have fifteen days excluded from the
1 65
period of the rule. Then along came Commonwealth v. Shields,
which held that the defendant is not limited to a single "free" thirty
day continuance.1 66 Each thirty-day continuance awarded defendant
was to be free in the sense that, as long as the continuance was
67
thirty days or less, the run date was not automatically extended.1
Thus, under Shields, the earlier example of three continuances of
163. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(d)(2).

164. This conclusion is based on Judge Marshall's experience as calendar judge
since October 1976.
165. Pa. Super. Ct. -, 371 A.2d 1333 (1977).
166. Id. at n.2, 371 A.2d at 1334 n.2.
167. Id. On December 1, 1977, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the
380 A.2d 782 (1977).
Pa. Shields rationale in Commonwealth v. Wade, __
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fifteen days each would result in no excludable time. The rule 1100
clock would continue to run during the full term of each of the three
continuances. Shields, therefore, makes it incumbent upon the
prosecution to ask for an extension of the time period where the
defendant's thirty-day continuances bring the prospective trial date
dangerously close to the run date. That motion, as is true of all
prosecution requests for extension, must be made within the run
date. 168 There is no provision for the granting of an extension on
"nunc pro tunc" applications. 169

Other jurisdictions have no "free thirty-day continuance" for the
defendant. Ohio provides as excludable periods "any continuance
granted on the accused's own motion and the period of any
reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused's own
motion." 170 Similarly, the federal rule for speedy trials provides that
all continuances sought by the defense are excludable from the time
period of the rule. 171 These jurisdictions, unlike Pennsylvania, are in
conformity with the ABA Standards relating to speedy trial which
72
make no provision for such a "free" thirty-day continuance.
While such a liberal excludable time period provision, as in the
ABA Standards, could circumvent the intent of the prompt trial rule
and interfere with the court's ability to control the movement of case
loads, such a provision does reduce the motion and application
activity necessary each time the run date is sought to be extended.
Assuming that all continuances are reasonable or they would not be
granted, the ABA Standards treat the prosecution and the defense
more equally.
Even though this free continuance section of rule 1100 is an
enigma and its rationale has never been articulated, it does serve as
a further demonstration of the determination of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court that trials be held within the period prescribed by
rule 1100.
IX.

CONCLUSION

There is no need to question the theorem that justice delayed is
justice denied. By the same token, hasty justice is not a preferred
alternative to delayed justice. 173 Rule 1100 is an attempt to expedite
168. See note 79 supra; Commonwealth v. Woods, 461 Pa. 255, 336 A.2d 273 (1975);
Commonwealth v. Cutillo, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 131, 339 A.2d 123 (1975).
169. See Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 465 Pa. 491, 498 n.9, 350 A.2d 872, 875 n.9
(1976).
170. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.72(H) (Page 1975).
171. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(8) (Supp. V 1975).
172. See ABA STANDARDS, Speedy Trial § 2.3(c) (1968).
173. For a discussion of court congestion and possible solutions, see Comisky,
Declare an End to Judicial Quotas, 36 FED. B.J. 30 (1977).
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the processing of criminal cases but not at the expense of
discouraging the exercising of considered and deliberate judgment
by prosecutors, defense attorneys and the courts.
The fact that the rule still has some rough edges and is not as
finely honed as the Rule in Shelley's Case is understandable. Rule
1100 has been held to the judicial whetstone for a short time only.
During this short time, however, the rule has proven itself
prophylactic in that it 1) insures against prosecutor's opting for the
political expediency of summary punishment - by keeping an
accused in jail or under the stress of unresolved criminal charges rather than facing the embarrassment of a sure acquittal;17 4 and 2)
impedes the defendant from thumbing his nose at society with an
endless stream of continuances.
The rule, without question, has placed more responsibility for
criminal calendar management on the trial courts than they have
heretofore had; however, statistics and experience demonstrate that
the responsibility has not been misplaced.
174. For a discussion of the facts of Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 431 Pa. 536,
246 A.2d 430 (1968), disclosing prosecutorial tactics, see note 34 supra.
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